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EMERGENCE OF A PRIVATE BANKING SECTOR IN THE
CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE ROLE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES
Philip M. Stupak*
I. "THE CZECH MIRACLE" OR THE PRIME MINISTER'S NEW CLOTHES?
In 1989, the Czech Republic' emerged from the specter of
communism not at Karl Marx's end of history, 2 but rather, at Adam Smith's
beginning. The challenges facing the Czech Republic, and all of the former
Soviet Bloc Central and Eastern European nations (CEEs), were enormous.
In determining how best to transition from a command economy to a free
market economy, most CEEs chose to undertake a slow and cautious march
towards a capitalist free market economy.4 The Czech Republic was the lone
exception.
Under the leadership of Vaclav Klaus,5 the Czech transitory
economy operated under the precept that faster is better. As a result, both
In 1995, the Czech
Klaus and the Czech Republic were rewarded.
Republic's rapid transformation from the most socialized of any economy in
" The author is a second-year law student at the University of Richmond
and was
awarded a BA. of Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in
2001.
1The author recognizes that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were a single Federal
nation until popular election split the Federation in 1993. The split, popularly
referred to as the Velvet Divorce, was largely due to the perception that post-Soviet
Czechoslovakia remained a nation in which the Czechs politically dominated the
country and the Slovaks. See ABBY LN.NES, CZECHOSLOVAKiA: THE SHORT
GOODBYE (2001), for an in depth analysis of the causes behind the Velvet Divorce.
The post-Divorce governments continued the reforms taken by the Federation. As a
result of the Czech political dominance before 1993, and the continuation of reforms
after 1993, this author will use the terms "Czech" and "Czech Republic" to refer to
the region that is now the Czech Republic without regard to whether that geoFolitical area was, at the time, a part of Czechoslovakia.
KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE CoMMum.1sT MANIFESTO (1872).
3 ADAM SMITH, AN LNQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776).
4 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatizationand Corporate Governance: The Lessons
From Securities Market Failure,25 J. CORP. L. 1, 9-16 (1999).
'Czech Finance Minister (December, 1989 to June, 1992) and Prime Minister of the
Czech Republic (June, 1992 to November, 1997).
6 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Czech Miracle: Why Privatization Went Right in the
Czech Republic, REASON, Apr. 1995, at 28.
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the Warsaw Pact to an advanced market economy was heralded as a miracle.
Two years later, the praise evaporated amid scandal and the resignation of
Prime Minister Klaus.8 The pundits declared, " 'the Czech Miracle of low
inflation, low unemployment and a growing economy was illusionary.' "9
But by the close of 1998, the Czech economy had stabilized and had once
again outperformed the other CEEs.10
An analysis of the banking systems in any of the CEEs is important
in determining the viability of a specific nation's economic reforms.
Horton," in his note on banking systems in the CEEs, argued that "[c]entral
to the success of these transitions [to market economies] will be the ability of
the region's banks to act as financial intermediaries between debtors and
creditors. The banks will need to facilitate payments between emerging
actors in the growing capitalist economies."' 2 The application of this
theoretical framework, specifically to the Czech Republic, is an appropriate
means to explain the fluctuations in the transitional Czech economy. Such
an application will show that the Czech banking system, which is based on
the German Universal Bank system (GUBs),13 is the entity charged with the
responsibilities of being a financial intermediary, facilitating payments
between parties, and providing the majority of finance capital.' 4 However,
the Czech banking sector's ability to adequately effectuate these
responsibilities was hampered by the Czech government's exclusion of the

7Id.; see also Steve H. Hanke, The Right Kind of Problem, FORBES, Mar. 27, 1995,

at 97.
8 Lee Hockstader, Czech's Downfall Shatters Hope for Economic Miracle:
Outgoing Prime Minister's Failed Reforms Viewed as Too Absolute, Arrogant to
Succeed, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at A31.
9Id. (quoting Mark Sanders).
'0See Coffee, supra note 5, at 16.
" William L. Horton, Jr., Note, The Perils of Universal Banking in Central and
Eastern Europe, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 683 (1995).
"'Id., at 683-84.
13 The German Universal Banking system is typified by a banking sector that is
wholly unified across the various banking disciplines. Fragmentation between
investment and personal finance banks does not exist - unlike in the United States.
Instead GUBs permit a single bank to offer a wide variety of banking services,
including checking accounts, exchange brokerages, and investment services. Thus,
GUBs permit a powerful banking system that heavily relies on agents within the
system to monitoring themselves. See Mark E. Nance & Bemd Singhof, Banking's
Influence Over Non-Bank Companies After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal
Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1305, 1349-79 (2000), for an excellent review
of the history and function of GUBs.
14

Id.
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four largest state banks from privatization plans until 1998.' This absence
of a privatized banking sector and, consequently the state-run banking
institutions, perpetuates a lack of democratic corporate governance in the
banking sector. 16 Without appropriate levels of corporate governance, the
banking sector's ability to succeed in its responsibilities is greatly
diminished, because "[a]lthough there are some rewards for succeeding in
managing a bank, there may not be sufficient incentives not to fail. In the
state-controlled banks .... the manager does not risk losing any of his own
capital."' 7 Additionally, as there are so few trained bank managers available,
an inept manager may not even lose his job.' 8 The problem with such a

system is largely that "the CEE bank corporate governance structure largely
lacks two of the most persuasive 'sticks' in the Western monitoring system loss of fortune and loss ofjob."' 9 Thus, a lack of a privatized banking sector

leads to a diminishment of effective corporate governance, which weakens
the ability of the banking sector to perform its crucial responsibilities in a
transitional economic system. This translates into a less successful
transitional economy.
This article explains the fluctuations of the Czech economy
regarding corporate governance in the Czech banking institutions. Part H
will explain the history of the banking systems in the Czech Republic and
what role those systems played in the transitional economy of the Czech

" See THE BANKER, CZECH REPUBLIC - BETTER LATE THAN NEVER (2002),

available at http://www.cnb.cz/en/_media/articles/020201.htm, for an excellent
discussion on the privatization of the Czech Republic's four largest banks, Komercni
Banka, Ceska Sporitelna, Investicni a Postovni Banka, and Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka.
16 Democratic corporate governance is a fairly nebulous term for which it is difficult
to provide an exact meaning. That being said, the author takes democratic corporate
governance to mean a system of controls over a corporate body that permits
shareholders to have actual control over the functions of the corporation. The
alternative to democratic corporate governance is control of a company by another
force (e.g. the state or a few directors). The superiority of a system within which
democratic corporate governance is allowed to flourish is that the owners of wealth
direct the businesses that create wealth; as such, those companies operate in a
manner that is in the best interests of the owners. The breakdown of an effective
system has such catastrophic effects as can be seen in Savings & Loans scandals of
the 1980s and the corporate meltdowns of 2001-02 (i.e. Enron and World-coin).
Theoretically, when a strong system of corporate governance is in place, such
catastrophes would not occur as such scandals only hurt shareholders and not the
directors who caused them.
7
Horton, supra note 12, at 709.
1s See id.
19 See id.
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Republic. Part III will examine the numerous reforms of banking institutions
employed by Klaus in 1998. Part IV will address the prospective question of
what the future holds for the Czech Republic banking system in light of the
recent installation of democratic corporate governance.
II. BANKING ON A FREE MARKET
Free markets are characterized by the exchange of capital for goods
and services. As shown above, the banking sector plays a crucial role in
holding, distributing, and increasing that capital. Under the Soviet state-run,
or command economy the goal was the elimination of all capital.
Naturally, the banking sectors of CEEs in the former Soviet bloc were
retarded compared to their western neighbors. Those CEEs were typified by
having one central bank whose responsibility was to distribute wealth from
the State to industry pursuant to a plan established by the State.2' Under this
system, corporate governance is lacking. Under a free market system, the
banking sector, like any corporation, has shareholders who possess a series
of controls over the bank managers; 22 however, in the state-run system, the
banking sector does not have supervisory shareholders,23 nor does the sector
have an adequate replacement that establishes some form of corporate
governance. As the Soviet system reduces and attempts to eliminate the
importance of capital, the role of the bank is also reduced. There is no need
for the banking system to be successful if the role of the bank is reduced by
the Soviet attack on capital. The banking sector will also quickly lose
effective corporate governance because of a lack of a purpose to succeed.
The government of the Czech Republic, in transitioning from a staterun economy to a free market economy, had the task of translating its sole
state-run bank into a functioning banking sector. The importance of a
banking sector is that the sector is able to finance the growth of an emerging
private sector. This was not an easy task. The Klaus government began

20

See generally MARx, supra note 3 (for a theoretical discussion of Soviet goals

with regard to the place of capital in a Communist utopia).
21 See Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe:
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1129,
1130 (1994); see also Horton, supra note 12, at 703.
22 See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, A PoliticalAnalysis of Bank FailureResolution, 74
B.U. L. REv. 429 (1994) (discussing the general role of bank shareholders); Martin
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 60-61 & n.280 (1987) (discussing the need to protect bank shareholders from
free market forces).
23 See generally, Patricia A. McCoy, Levers of Law Reform: Public Goods and
Russian Banking, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45 (1997) (describing the banking system
in Soviet Russia).
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reform by eliminating the monopoly of the Czech National Bank (CNB) and
by issuing sixty-three (63) banking licenses.24 These bank licenses permitted
foreign banks to open branches and allowed small private banks to take
hold.25 The CNB still remained to dictate financial policy, but its monopoly
was broken down and vested into several large state-run banks.26 Komercni
Banka (KB), Ceska Sporitelna (CS), Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB),
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (CSOB), and Zivnostenska Banka (ZB)
controlled two-thirds of the total assets of the banking sector and accounted
for nearly three-quarters of the total credits and deposits in the Czech
Republic."
In 1992, ZB was sold with 52% going to foreign banks.28
However, the reforms of the banking sector stopped at this point. According
to the Minister of Privatization, Thomas Jezek, "the status of bank
privatization is just where it was 'when I left the Privatization Ministry in
June 1992. Klaus made no change - nothing. '9
Numerous problems arise from halting reform and preventing further
privatization of the banking sector. The stifling of effective corporate
governance under this system has already been discussed; however, in
addition to lacking "the two largest 'sticks,' "3 the Czech state-run banking
system seems to reward managers for making bad business decisions.
Horton reports that "in some cases the CEE bank governance system actually
rewards [inefficient managers].
Managers . . . are not free to make
completely independent credit allocative decisions. It is not politically
feasible right now to allow the failure of all of the state firms that would
collapse were their credit to be restricted."" Marek Pol, Poland's Minister of

14

See United States Department of Commerce, The Centraland Eastern European

Business Information Center: Market Research: Analysis of the Czech Banking
System, at http://www.mac.doc.govieebic countryr/czechr/market/CZBankSysAnaLhtm (last visited January 7, 2003).
25Karel Fiala & Filip Hnuska, CurrentFinancialand Investment Emironment in the
Czech Republic, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 296, 299 (Sum. 1995).
2 See United States Department of Commerce, supra note 25.
27id
28 The

International Finance Corporation (IFC) purchased 12% and the Berliner
Handelss-und-Frankfiurter Bank (BHF-Bank) purchased 40%. It is important to note
that between 1992 and 1998 the dominant shareholder, BHF-Bank increased its
ownership to 47%; however, control of the bank was not vested in a sole shareholder
until 2000 when BankgeseUschaft (BG), who had purchased BHF-Bank's shares in
1998, increased their shares to 85.16%. See THE BANKER, supra note 16.
'9Thomas W. Hazlett, Is the "Czech Miracle" Over? Or Still to Come? .4Report
From Prague,REASON, Mar. 1, 1998, at 40, availableat
http://reason.com/9803/fe.hazlettshtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
30 Horton, supra note 12, at 709.
31
id
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Industry and Trade, indicated this concern, stating that "of course we can say
'Let's not reduce [state firms'] debts, let them go under!' But the problem is,
their collapse would lead to the collapse of the whole country, because no
one would be able to maintain such a huge army of unemployed. 32 Thus,
for political reasons the state-run banks in the Czech Republic continue the
old role as mono-banks in an effort to support the inefficiency of the state
supported industrial complex. Horton continues,
[t]here is evidence that some bank managers are voluntarily
rolling over interest payments into new loans to maintain the
stability of their banks. Not only does this potentially
increase the size of the nonperforming loan pool, but it also
allows [state owned enterprises] to avoid paying their debts
for a longer period of time.33
Normally it would be difficult to determine whether a banking sector was
actively seeking to prop up failing industries without obtaining some form of
documentation. In the Czech case it is possible to infer that the state-run
banking sectors were performing such a task. By 1995, unemployment in the
Czech Republic was stabilized around 3.5%.34
Comparatively, the
unemployment rate of the United States in April of 1995 was 5.8%, 35 and
during the dot-coin boom the unemployment rate of the United States was
between 4.2% and 4.3%.36 The Czech Republic unemployment rate was
phenomenal. Given the Czech economic crash that came in 1996 to 1998, it
is reasonable to infer that the low unemployment rate partially resulted from
the state-run banks helping to prop up failing industries.
The lack of corporate governance and the resulting poor
management of the state-run banks are only one problem that the banking
sector experienced in the early half of the 1990s. The rapid privatization of
Czech industry was achieved through the use of a voucher system. Under
the voucher system, "[a]dult citizens would bid for companies with voucher
coupons, with each entitled to buy one booklet of 1,000 'points' for a
nominal sum."'37 The voucher system could have been expected to create a
framework in which shareholders would quickly establish democratic
32
33

id.
ld. at 709-10.

34 Hazlett, supra note 7.
35 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation:April 1995 (May

5, 1995), availableat
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/empsit.050595.news.
36 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation: July 1999
(August 6, 1999), availableat
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/empsit.08061999.news.
Hazlett, supra note 7.
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corporate governance over the privatized sectors of the Czech economy.
Corporate governance failed to materialize primarily because of the Czech
Republic's use of the GUBs, which invested the role of exchange brokerages
in the state run banks. Professor Coffee, a renowned professor of corporate
law at Columbia, argues that the rapid privatization method utilized by the
Czech Republic has the potential to create a system of corporate governance
because "they aggregated large stakes in Czech corporations and thereby
potentially solved the collective action problem that the dispersed ownership
resulting from voucher privatization necessarily implied." 38 Coffee goes on
to reason that this did not happen because the investment funds, which
managed the newly dispersed ownership, were "established by the principal
Czech commercial and savings banks, which had the obvious reputational
advantages in convincing Czech citizens to deposit their vouchers with
them. '3 9

A conflict of interest arose for the Czech government. The state
wanted to remove their influence over the newly privatized stock, but the
state was not prepared to sacrifice its' control over the banking sector. Thus,
a conflict emerges between the state's desire to remove itself from the
privatized companies and the desire to retain control over the banks (which,
under the GUBs, is the only investment firm available to the owners of the
dispersed stock). The solution to this conundrum was troubling. In an effort
to remove government control, the state-run banks restricted themselves to
owning only small stakes in their investment funds. 40 The banks did not seek
to improve the profitability of their investment funds, because there was only
a limited financial gain to be had from owning such small amounts of their
funds. 41 Instead of seeking limited financial gain by improving the
profitability of their funds, the banks sought the greater financial gain in
using their investment funds to acquire corporate banking clients. "Rather
than concentrating their holdings (and thus maximizing their influence), most
bank-administered funds sought to diversify their holdings in order to hold
stakes in as many firms as possible - in part to solicit banking for their
parents." 42 Thus, control of the banks by the state, and a lack of democratic
corporate governance, led the banks' portfolio managers to purposefully
avoid increasing profits of the investor's portfolios because the banks only
owned small stakes in their investment funds.
Additionally, the
implementation of the GUBs into the Czech banking sector led directly to the
institutional problems of vesting the majority of the exchange brokerage
38 Coffee,
39

id.
40 See id.

41 id.
42 id.

supra note 5, at 12-13.
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responsibilities into the state-run banks and not into the smaller privatized
investment houses.
Although the banking sector diversified away from being
consolidated into the CNB, there was still the same lack of democratic
corporate governance, in the five major banks, that plagued the CNB under
Soviet leadership.
Without the privatization of those banks and the
subsequent democratic corporate governance that follows the insertion of
shareholders, the banking sector did not possess any forms of control and
thus, shackled the economic growth of the Czech Republic's transitory
economy. The names of the banking players may have changed and grown,
but the underlying problems of the monopolistic state-run economy remained
entrenched in the banking sector. The result was a general recession and
failure of the Czech economy as predicted by Horton in 1995.43 "Capitalism,
one might easily conclude from all this, had been as much a bust in the
Czech Republic as communism."" If the Czech economy was going to
continue its transition into a free market economy, something would have to
change.
III. A LITTLE REFORMATION
Banking sector reforms were needed in 1998. In looking at the
above examples of banking failure, there were two different methods by
which the Czech government could fix their bank sector. One option was to
replace the GUJBs with a system similar to the American system, where
shareholders would be required to buy and sell stock through an exchange
brokerage. This would have the benefit of consolidating the dispersed
stocks, resulting from the voucher system used during the mass
privatizations, in exchange houses whose brokers have only one purpose - to
increase the value of their clients' portfolios. The exchange houses would
therefore have a vested interest to improve the companies that make up their
portfolios. This would, in turn, spurn economic growth throughout the
Czech Republic by bringing democratic corporate governance directly to
corporations through the brokers. By shifting to either a modified GUBs, or
totally abolishing the GUBs, the Czech government would move governance
from the state, whose modus operandi is political and not fiscal, and place it
into an organization whose purpose is to increase capital wealth. However,

43While Horton's prediction was not specifically made about the Czech Republic, its

application can easily be established (as this article did earlier). See infra pp. 2-3.
Moreover, after the boom of 1995 ended and the subsequent economic bust began,
many pundits were specifically saying what Horton had generally theorized three
years earlier. See generally, Horton, supra note 12.
44 Hazlet, supra note 30.
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the Czech government did not opt to utilize this method of reform. Instead
the government chose the second option - to focus on, and fix, the existing
problems in the GUBs.
The predominant problem with the banking sector, aside from the
institutional faults of a GUBs, was the lack of democratic corporate
governance. Without such governance the Czech banking sector did not
answer to anyone for implementing failing business practices. Quite the
opposite, a state-run bank system is geared towards intentionally not
implementing smart business practices if those practices might lead to an
increase in unemployment or the loss of an important industrial sector.45
Sound corporations must make business decisions in light of what is best for
the shareholders. Comparatively, a state-run banking sector must make
business decisions in light of what is politically correct instead of what is
fiscally correct because their shareholders, the central government, are not
interested in fiscal returns, but rather, in political currency.
In 1998, the Czech Parliament attempted to introduce true
shareholders to their banking sector and they sold a majority share of IPB,
the third largest bank, to the Japanese corporation Nomora. 46 For the first
time since the failure of communism a majority share in one of the top Czech
banks was held by a private organization. Numerous problems existed with
this first deal;47 but despite these problems the Czech government continued
to rapidly privatize the banking sector. In 1999, a majority interest in the
fourth largest bank, CSOB, was sold to the Belgian KBC Bank. 48 In 2000, a
number of bank sales took place. The second largest bank, CS, had a 52%
interest sold to the Erste Bank, the fifth largest bank, ZB, had the minority
shareholder BG increase their shares from 47% to 85.16%; and IPB merged
with CSOB and thereby replaced KB as the dominant Czech bank. 49 The
4

s See infra pp. 3, 6-7.
4'The transaction involved the direct sale of 36% of IPB from the state to Nomora
and a subsequent new capital submission increased Nomora's shares to a majority of
IPB. See THE BANKER, supra note 16.

IPB quickly returned to the Czech Parliament after it became apparent that IPB
was laden with numerous debts incurred by providing loans, at the bequest of the
Czech government, to inefficiently run industries. Additionally, Nomora did not
attempt to fix the problems in IPB; but rather, wished to hold the company in its
portfolio for many of the same reasons the Czech banking sector acted as exchange
houses in the early privatization schemes. In 2000 IPB was again sold by Parliament
to CSOB, who was at that time owned by the Belgian KBC Bank, and the
subsequent merger of IPB and CSOB made CSOB the largest bank in the Czech
Republic. See id. for a thorough discussion of the problems facing both IPB and the
privatization of a major state run bank.
4 id.
491id.
4'
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privatization of the banking sector was complete with the sale of 60% of KB
to Socit6 Gdn~rale in 2001.5 o With complete privatization at last true
corporate governance could pierce the veil of indifference that was so
pervasive under the state-run banking system.
The lack of experienced managers was a recurring problem in the
Czech banking sector. Existing managers knew their positions were safe,
since the bodies governing the Czech banks could not fire the managers
despite their ineptitude for making savvy business decisions. The Czech
government overcame this crucial problem by involving only foreign
corporations in the privatization of the banking sector. By selling the
banking sector to foreign corporations based in the western countries of
France, Germany, Japan, and Belgium, it is reasonable to expect that the new
parent corporations had the personnel resources to bring in qualified
managers to replace failing Czech managers, and to train future Czech
executives. Thus, the privatization solution proved superior to the proposed
GUBs deconstruction solution because privatization was the only solution
that permitted an easy influx of experienced managers.
The Czech Parliament also undertook several other reforms in 1998.
First, the nation was preparing to enter the European Union, but in order to
do so, the Czech Republic's fiscal rules had to come into accord with
western Europe. This meant adapting to the principles regarding competition
laid out in the Treaty of Rome. 5 1 Also, the Czech Parliament attempted to
combat earlier problems of a lack of transparency by establishing a Czech
version of the American Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee all
transfers and regulation of stocks. 2
Shortly after the implementation of these reforms, the Czech
economy rebounded and began to climb out of its recession. 3 While the
short term effects of the banking sector reforms seem positive, it will be
important to see whether they are able to withstand future challenges as the
Czech economy becomes integrated into the European Union and leaves the
ambit of a "transitory economy" in favor of being a full free market
economy.
IV. WHAT Now?

With the 1998 Czech banking reforms, new life has been given
through democratic corporate governance. With shareholders directly
overseeing the business decisions of the Czech Republic's banks, new
50

id.

51 Treaty on European Union, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
52 See Coffee, supra note 5, at 11.
51 See id. at 16.
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transparency in the Czech stock market, and qualified and experienced bank
managers available from western free market economies, the future should
be bright for the Czech Republic. The largest remaining problem from the
banking sector is a large public debt as a result of the government taking
responsibility for the numerous bad loans the state-run banks made to failing
industries at the bequest of the Czech government. The IMF currently
estimates this debt is currently at 11.8 billion USD. 54 While this is a large
debt for a country of thirty million people, entrance into the European Union
could feasibly help alleviate the cost of transitioning the Czech economy into
a free market based economy.
The Czech Miracle was shrouded in unseen problems when the shift
to a market economy first began. The lack of democratic corporate
governance in the banking sector clearly hindered the ability of the Czech
economy to make a successful transition to a free market. The lesson that
can be learned is the importance of the banking sector in emerging
economies. If other nations attempt to shift to a capitalist system though a
rapid privatization of state-run institutions, then one of the first industries
that must make the switch is the capital managing banking sector. By
employing the principles of democratic corporate governance early in the
transition process, a government can insure that the tools will be present to
support a growing private sector. Markets do not develop without a need,
but by employing democratic corporate governance through shareholders,
then that need will emerge as they demand higher revenue from their
corporations. The need of shareholders to increase their profit will build
markets and those markets will in turn build a successful capitalist economy.

5See

THE BANKER, supra note 13.

